Monday, June 13, 2011

The Empire Has No Clothes

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Highlights
  • The U.S. maintains more than 700 military bases worldwide, spanning an area that dwarfs the great empires of world history. Although many leaders today support a policy of foreign interventionism, extensive military engagement around the world is a policy at odds with principles of the republic’s founders—and at odds with the economic, political, and security interests of the American people.

  • The U.S. has military dominance but no longer the economic dominance to match; it accounts for nearly 40 percent of the world’s military spending but only about 30 percent of global GDP. The U.S. is so dominant today only because other empires declined as a result of losing wars (Germany and Japan) or becoming overextended abroad relative to their frail economies (Britain, France, and the Soviet Union). If the U.S. stays the course, America’s economic dominance and political influence will likely decline.

  • Why is the U.S. disproportionately attacked by terrorists? Although the president, other highlevel policymakers, the foreign policy elite, the media, and even large segments of the public are in a state of denial, the key factor is obvious to the rest of the world: the interventionist U.S. foreign policy in support of the informal American global empire. The U.S. has received unfavorable ratings from people in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries around the world, not because of its political and economic freedoms or its culture, but because of its policies—particularly toward the Middle East.

  • Small government conservatives who favor military adventurism should check their history and rethink their assumptions. Increases in nondefense spending have been lower during administrations in which warfare was sporadic or nonexistent (Carter, Reagan, Bush I, and Clinton) than during the three administrations in which major long-term wars were being fought. Like prior wars, Bush II’s “War on Terror” has led to increases in both defense spending and nondefense spending (which has increased more during the wartime presidency of George W. Bush than during any comparable period since the wartime administration of Lyndon Johnson).

  • Knowing that popular support for military actions unrelated to American security is fragile, U.S. policymakers resort to “war on the cheap.” This strategy has resulted in the use of military tactics that increase casualties among civilians in the nation being helped. The use of heavy U.S. air and ground firepower results in the moral equivalent of killing people to save them. Thus, military interventions for humanitarian purposes usually achieve the opposite result and are morally questionable.

  • Heavy-handed U.S. military intervention to facilitate social work almost always fails because of the onset of mission creep (e.g., in Lebanon and Somalia), the creation of enemies as a result of taking sides in local disputes or using excessive force (e.g., in Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq), the exacerbation of original problems (e.g., ethnic cleansing in Kosovo), or the loss of public support at home (e.g., in Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq).

  • In a post–Cold War world, taking into account only the security of American citizens, their property, and U.S. territory, the benefits of an interventionist foreign policy have declined and the costs have escalated dramatically. Americans continue to pay excessive taxes to defend countries that are rich enough to defend themselves or to occupy conquered countries in the world’s backwaters (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan). Their sons and daughters are killed on remote foreign battlefields for reasons even more remote from U.S. vital interests.

Synopsis

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