Though
Gen. Robert E. Lee trusted Joseph E. Johnston in command in North
Carolina, his continued retreat in front of Sherman greatly alarmed Lee,
who wrote “Should you be forced back in this direction [Richmond] both
armies would certainly starve. You must judge what the probabilities
will be of arresting Sherman by battle. A bold and unexpected attack
might relieve us.”
Bernhard Thuersam, Chairman
North Carolina War Between the States Sesquicentennial Commission
"Unsurpassed Valor, Courage and Devotion to Liberty"
"The Official Website of the North Carolina WBTS Sesquicentennial"
Seeking to Seriously Wound Sherman
“Sherman
came on irresistibly – like Lord Cornwallis – North Carolinians were
reminded. The feeling of dread, of terror, may have been comparable to
the folk tales of their grandparents, but not the speed, the destructive
power, the calamitous results. Compared to Sherman’s, Cornwallis’s
invasion during the Revolution was child’s play.
Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, fell on February 17;
Charleston, the following morning; Wilmington, on the twenty-second.
Richmond had looked to Gen. Pierre G.T. Beauregard to coordinate
defensive efforts and obstruct Sherman’s advance . . . [though he
resorted] to heady 1861 rhetoric; concentrate 35,000 Confederates at
Salisbury, North Carolina and fight Sherman there, “crush him, then to
concentrate all forces against Grant, and then to march on Washington to
dictate a peace.”
[Once
Robert E. Lee was appointed] commander-in-chief of all Confederate
armies . . . Lee turned to President Jefferson Davis and asked that
Joseph E. Johnston be retrieved from oblivion. With greatest reluctance,
Davis acquiesced [though concerned that the] General will not risk a
battle unless he has all the chances in his favor.” Lee wired Johnston
on February 22. “Concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman.”
The
controversial Johnston had worked a miracle before – when he gathered
fragments of two defeated Confederate armies at Dalton, Georgia, in
early 1864, and fashioned them into an effective fighting force that
proceeded to frustrate Sherman’s heavier numbers and resources for three
months.
Sherman’s
strategy by the last week of February 1865 was becoming clear to the
Confederates. He would continue to push through the Carolinas, up into
Virginia, and there unite with Grant against Lee. Lee doubted that
Sherman would move northwest via Charlotte . . . rather, Lee expected
him to turn toward Goldsboro and the coast – to snap the vital
[Wilmington &] Weldon railroad and unite with Schofield.
On February 24,
Johnston went to Charlotte, assumed command from Beauregard, and
immediately held a review. [The troops cheered the General] and this
feeling of confidence in Johnston and enthusiasm over his return to
command swept through the ranks and the officer’s corps of the Army of
Tennessee. They loved the man. He could redeem them. They knew it.
Once
[Johnston combined his disparate forces into one, he] would possess a
sizable fore, admittedly less than half of Sherman’s numbers but
sufficient to cause mischief, perhaps even to wound his adversary
seriously. If Sherman’s army could be caught divided and fought in
fractions, certainly before he united with [his other wing], there might
be hope of checking, perhaps defeating, part of his force – an isolated
column perhaps. Once this had been accomplished, other positive
opportunities would present themselves.”
(Bentonville, The Final Battle of Sherman & Johnston, Nathaniel C. Hughes, Jr., UNC Press, 1996, pp. 21-24)
