Via John
Published on “Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association” by Merle L. Pribbenow in January, 2001. Direct link for those wanting to look through the bibliography: General Hieu
For the past 35 years the US Army and the North Vietnamese have
claimed victory in the October to November 1965 Ia Drang Valley Battle.
While the United States side of the battle has been extensively
documented, the Vietnamese version has remained obscure.
Although heavily colored by communist hagiography and propaganda, recently published
People's
Army of Vietnam (PAVN) accounts provide answers to many questions and
acknowledge a number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) mistakes and
command failures. When added to information from US sources, these
accounts reveal how greatly the fog of war, over optimism and blind
fate influenced the battle.
The B3 Front Plan
According to PAVN, the Ia Drang Battle grew out of the B3
(Central Highlands) Front's plan to lure US and South Vietnamese forces
into battle on terms favorable to the communists. The plan included
besieging the remote Plei Me border outpost south of Pleiku in South
Vietnam's Central Highlands and forcing US and South Vietnamese forces
to come to the rescue. The goal was to annihilate five or six US
companies.
1
The NVA 320th and 33d Regiments were to launch the campaign, but
one of the NVA's finest units, the 304th Division would reinforce the
B3 Front. In August 1965 the 304th received orders to move south to the
Central Highlands. The 304th's lead element, the 66th Regiment, was
scheduled to arrive in time for the campaign's final phase.
2
Aware they could not match newly arrived US forces. power, NVA
commanders knew their strategy was risky. During political
indoctrination sessions before the campaign began, 320th Regiment
troops expressed serious doubts.
3
Stunning Blows
