In 1995, the commander of 2d Ranger Battalion, then Lieutenant-Colonel Stanley McChrystal, decreed that for his Rangers, hand-to-hand combat training, “combatives,” needed to be viewed as a critical skill. Considering the transformation of mission focus the Regiment as a whole was undergoing during this period of time, there sound reasons for his decision (I served in the Regiment during from 1994 through 1997, when I left for SFQC. The transformation that occurred was mind-blowing. We went from traditional infantry patrolling through the woods to an objective to assault an objective, and airborne-assault airfield seizures, as a private, to almost exclusively performing special operations missions by the time I left. As one NCO termed it, the Ranger Regiment became a “Tier 1.5” special missions unit. –J.M.)
A successful integration of close-quarters marksmanship training, close-quarters combat tactics, techniques, and procedures, and a refined, doctrinal combatives program that actually worked, allowed the men of the Regiment to accomplish these “new” missions in a more efficient manner, bringing greater lethality to bear on the enemy, across the spectrum. The basic fight-strategy taught as an integral part of “Ranger Combatives” (the forerunner of the now doctrinal Modern Army Combatives Program/MACP and the Special Operations Combatives Program/SOCP), serves to facilitate a greater, more in-depth understanding of the conceptual philosophical framework of effective close-quarters combat for young Rangers.
The three aspects of the fight strategy—close the distance, gain dominant position, and finish the fight—are as critical in a gunfight as they are in a fist fight.
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