General George B. McClellan believed that the War against the American South
should be “conducted according to the established usage of civilized
nations,” not against civilians, and with an intent to minimize
destruction and casualties.
Bernhard Thuersam, Chairman
North Carolina War Between the States Sesquicentennial Commission
"The Official Website of the North Carolina WBTS Sesquicentennial"
Richmond Must Fall to a Republican General:
“McClellan’s
troubles began when some Democratic papers in early 1862 began touting
him as a presidential candidate in 1864. This was not his doing, but it
sealed his fate. The Republicans in Congress and the White House
realized that they had a problem: Were McClellan to capture Richmond, he
would pose a serious threat to Lincoln’s reelection. In other words,
military victory in 1862 meant political defeat in 1864.
[The
Republicans] could not demote McClellan, however: He was too popular
and respected, and they had no reason they could give for doing so.
Their only was out of this dilemma was for McClellan and the Army of
the Potomac to fail. And it appears that Lincoln and his new Secretary
of War, Edwin M. Stanton, deliberately sabotaged McClellan’s peninsular
campaign.
….McClellan
was right to advance on Richmond from the east, via the peninsula
between the James and York Rivers, as opposed to the overland route
favored by the [Lincoln] administration. It was shorter, had fewer
natural obstacles, and could be supplied and reinforced easily by sea,
but it was McClellan’s plan, and that doomed it.
At
the outset of the campaign, the President, after assuring McClellan
otherwise, transferred [General Louis] Blenker’s division to General
[John] Fremont in the Shenandoah Valley; then he withheld [General
Irvin] McDowell’s Corps (for the defense of Washington, he claimed).
That was 50,000 troops. A member of his staff told him: “General, the
authorities at Washington are painfully afraid that you will succeed in
taking Richmond, and therefore are stripping your army in the
beginning.”
So,
when the Seven Days battles commenced in late June [1862], McClellan,
on the offensive, was outnumbered (101,000 to 112,000).
These
engagements hardly amounted to the decisive repulse they are sometimes
described as. McClellan’s command suffered fewer casualties than did the
Confederates (15,849 to 20,614), little equipment or supplies were
lost, and his new position on the James River was secure; with
reinforcements, he could had resumed the offensive in August.
The
President’s decision to terminate the campaign and withdraw McClellan’s
army was not a military one. Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia was
ready to march south. Richmond would be taken by a Republican general,
or not at all. Pope issued orders that essentially authorized the
plundering of civilians and the destruction of property. The reign of
arson and theft had begun.
When
McClellan heard of the new policy, he was appalled and vowed never to
carry it out: “I will not permit this army to degenerate into a mob of
thieves.” He later sent a letter of rebuke to Lincoln: The war “should
be conducted according to the highest principles known to Christian
civilization. It should not be….a War upon population; but against armed
forces and political organizations.”
(The Path Not Taken, H.A. Scott Trask, Chronicles Magazine, February 2006, (excerpt) page 33) www.chroniclesmagazine.org
I have no argument that the Valley campaign, at least under Sheridan and Sherman's operations in Georgia were close to war crimes, but the rest of the article is crap.
ReplyDeleteWhat doomed McClellan's plan was that he was an indecisive commander. Just some of the inaccuracies. The US Army webpages estimate the total Confederate forces involved in the defense of Richmond at 95,000. No one other than Mr. Trask puts the number at 112,000 and the only other person who thought McClellan was outnumbered was McClellan. "Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia was ready to march south." The Army of Virginia was created on June 26th, 1862, 5 days before the last battle of the Peninsular Campaign. It did not receive any troops from the Army of the Potomac, McClellan's command, until later in the summer after the campaign was over.
Early in the campaign, when he was closer to Richmond than Lee, and while Lee with 30,000 men was caught on the other side of the river with no accessible bridges, he did not advance and take Richmond. After winning the final battle of the campaign, Malvern Hill, McClellan ordered a retreat. He issued an order to Porter, to spike his heavy guns if he could not withdraw them. That was his order after winning. That is why he failed.
He was also replaced after Antietem (Sharpsburg) because he failed to crush Lee's retreating army which would have ended the war in the east. He had the troops to take Richmond on at least two occasions, but because he was an ineffective leader and not because of politics he did not.