Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Counter Insurgency and the Regular Army

 

During the Cold War the US Army and US Marine Corps pushed to Special Forces and Force Recon the job of "counter guerilla" and "counter insurgent."

When facing the Russian Bear at sometimes spitting distances the Top Brass had to prioritize men, equipment, and training.  The choice they made emphasized conventional fire and maneuver tactics to support two strategic goals, 1. Prevent war by maintaining a professional Army ready to respond at a moments notice, and 2. In the event of failure of Goal #1, win on the field of battle.

During the Cold War units from SOCOM did all the "back of nowhere brush wars" that were not on the strategic radar of our national interests.  Green Berets deployed all over South America fighting Communism and Drug Cartels, and South America has been relatively stable as a result.  The low level insurgency in the Philippines has seen constant US support to the legitimate Filipino government.  You could say that Green Berets have been going after MILF since the 1980s.  (Get your head out of the gutter, MILF is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front).

The doctrine, tactics, and strategies embraced by Regular Army Combat Arms Officers was highly efficient (and still is) at creating leaders who could win tactical engagements on the field of battle.  We saw how this failed to work in Vietnam, where Counter Insurgency (COIN) was actively discouraged by top Army brass.

The British Army, with a long heritage of "Empire Policemen" to live up to, did not divorce the function of "counter insurgent" from their Regular Officers, and taught that civil support via military operations is a legitimate function of the Regular Army.  Comparing the British response to the insurgency in Malaya against the American response to Vietnam as John Nagl did in "Learning to eat soup with a knife" makes it clear that if the Regular Army wants to be good at counter insurgency, it has to maintain a tradition of counter insurgency in the regular Army.

Early in the Vietnam conflict Green Berets were generally doing what we consider "effective COIN tactics" in building up local security, supporting the local villages, and growing the native forces to deal with the insurgents.

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