From Short Limited War to Major Conflagration

 

After the defeat and occupation of France in 1940, Britain and its allies would not consider German peace offers and forced Adolf Hitler to choose between “victory or destruction.” The pertinent question of the necessity of World War II is deeply mined in Patrick J. Buchanan’s provocative “Churchill, Hitler and the Unnecessary War.”  Bernhard Thuersam

From Short Limited War to Major Conflagration

“The real story of any great event is apt to be very different to what appears at the time. That is especially the case in war.  The fate of millions of people turns on decisions that are taken by one man – who may be influenced by the most curious of motives in reaching a decision that changes the whole course of history.  The way he makes up his mind is known only by a few men who behind the scenes, who usually have good reason for keeping it quiet. The truth sometimes leaks out later; sometimes never.

The escape of the British Army from France has often been called the “miracle of Dunkirk.”  For the German armoured forces had reached the Channel behind the back of the British Army while this was still deep in Flanders.  Those who got away have often wondered how they managed to do so.

The answer is that Hitler’s intervention saved them – when nothing else could have. A sudden order from him over the telephone stopped the armoured forces just as they were in sight of Dunkirk, and held them back until the retreating British had reached the port and slipped out of their clutches.

But although the British Army thus escaped from the trap in France, it was in no state to defend England. It had left most of its weapons behind, and the stores at home were almost empty. Yet the invasion never came. 

At the time we believed that the repulse of the Luftwaffe in the “Battle over Britain” had saved her.  That is only part of the explanation.  The original cause, which goes deeper, is that Hitler did not want to conquer England. He took little interest in the invasion preparations, did nothing to spur them on, and cancelled them at the first plausible excuse.  

After the conquest of Poland, and the division of the spoils with Russia, Hitler made a bid for peace with the Western Powers. When he was rebuffed he began to feel afraid of what he had started – and of his temporary partner.  He expressed the view that a long-drawn-out war of attrition with Britain and France would gradually exhaust Germany’s limited resources, and expose her to fatal attack from behind by Russia. 

[Hitler] summoned a conference in Berlin, on November 23 [1940] . . . “By no treaty or pact can Russia’s lasting neutrality be ensured,” he told his generals. His fear urged him to force peace on France by an offensive in the West.  He hoped that if the French were defeated, the British would see reason and come to terms. He reckoned that time was working against him on every count . . . [and] even Hitler did not display much assurance of success at this time. 

A copy of this address was found in the archives of the Supreme Command after Germany’s collapse, and produced at Nuremburg.  But there was no mention of the opposition that Hitler had met [from his generals] in the discussion . . .”

(The German Generals Talk, Startling Revelations from Hitler’s High Command, B.H. Liddell Hart, Quill, 1975 (original 1948), pp. 105-110)